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NOTE
THE FLORES SETTLEMENT: RIPPING
FAMILIES APART UNDER THE LAW
NATALIE LAKOSIL*
INTRODUCTION
The following quote is from an unknown former detainee at the
Artesia Family Detention Center:
When we arrived at the U.S. border, I felt relieved because I thought
we were finally safe. But immigration officials took my daughter and
me to a place out in the middle of nothing in Artesia, New Mexico,
where we were housed in trailers surrounded by barbed wire fences
and cut off from the rest of the world. I only wanted to keep my
daughter safe, that’s why I came to the United States. But I couldn’t
keep her safe, not when we were locked away for months on end in a
place that is bad for children. I understand that immigration officials
need to have a system for keeping track of asylum seekers like my
daughter and me while we wait for our legal hearings, but I don’t think
putting us in jail is the right way to do it. Why are we punishing chil-
dren who have done nothing wrong? The only thing we have done is
seek a safer, happier place for our children. Wouldn’t any mother do
that for her children?1
* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2018; B.A. Journalism and
Pre-Law, University of Arizona, May 2007. The author would like to thank her family, friends, and
the entire Golden Gate University Law Review staff for their constant support and encouragement
throughout the writing process. The author would also like to thank Professor Helen Chang,
Professor Michael Daw, Professor Leslie Rose, and Professor Thomas Schaaf for their support and
guidance.
1 Andrea L. Alford, Bait-and-Switch: As One Family Detention Center Closes, Another
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The United States hosts the biggest immigration detention infra-
structure in the world, detaining roughly 380,000 to 442,000 persons
each year.2 In the 2013 fiscal year, the federal government detained more
than 400,000 people in approximately 200 immigration jails.3 Prior to the
1980s, approximately 30 individuals were in immigration detention each
day.4 Currently, the detention population has increased to roughly 34,000
people each day.5 On average, it costs taxpayers $90.43 per day to detain
an individual in a private immigration detention facility, compared to the
average of $72.69 for individuals in a municipal jail.6
In 2014, in response to the “surge” of 60,000 unaccompanied chil-
dren and 26,000 families reaching the U.S. border, the federal govern-
ment expanded its family detention centers.7 Many of the families that
are exposed to family detention are from the “Northern Triangle” coun-
tries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.8 The “Northern Trian-
gle” is currently undergoing a well-documented human rights crisis.9
Almost 90% of individuals in family detention centers that are from the
region pass their “credible or reasonable fear interviews” while seeking
asylum.10
2 Immigration Detention Maps & Statistics, CIVIC, http://www.endisolation.org/resources/im-
migration-detention/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
3 Immigration Detention 101, DET. WATCH NETWORK, https://www.detentionwatchnetwork
.org/issues/detention-101 (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
4 Immigration Detention Maps & Statistics, CIVIC, http://www.endisolation.org/resources/im-
migration-detention/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Pamela Constable, U.S. Holding Families in Custody to Keep Others From Crossing the
Border, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/us-
holding-families-in-custody-to-keep-others-from-crossing-the-border/2016/03/05/14fc9fb6-da6d-
11e5-891a-4ed04f4213e8_story.html?utm_term=.522d04eaabfa.
8 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf.
9 Id. In 2016/2017 the “Northern Triangle,” which is made up of the countries of “El Salva-
dor, Guatemala and Honduras was one of the world’s most violent places, with more people killed
there than in most conflict zones globally. El Salvador’s homicide rate of 108 per 100,000 inhabi-
tants was one of the highest in the world. For many, daily life was overshadowed by criminal
gangs.” Americas 2016/2017, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/re-
port-americas/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
10 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf. Credible or reasona-
ble fear interviews occur when an individual is seeking asylum in the United States. Asylum is
granted based on if an individual has either “suffered persecution or fear that they will suffer perse-
cution due to: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, [or] political opin-
ion.” Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-
asylum/asylum (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
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The quote from the detained mother above has become an all too
familiar story.11 This Note focuses on families’ experiences in immigra-
tion detention centers, specifically how they are affected by the govern-
ment practice of releasing children without simultaneously releasing their
parents. In Flores v. Lynch,12 a plaintiff class consisting of minors de-
tained in the legal custody of the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”)13 sued then acting Attorney General of the United States,
Loretta Lynch and other U.S. government organizations.14 The suit
sought to enforce a 1997 consent decree between the parties.15 The con-
sent decree, (“the Settlement”) implements standards that the govern-
ment must abide by while minors are detained in custody.16 Additionally,
the Settlement dictates who can take custody of such minors upon their
release from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) de-
tainment.17 The Flores plaintiff class sought to enforce the Settlement in
family detention centers where members of the class were being de-
tained.18 The government argued that the Settlement only applies to un-
accompanied minors and is not applicable to minors who are detained
with their parents in family detention centers.19
In Flores, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit20
held that the Settlement pertains to all minors detained in government
custody.21 Additionally, the court held that the Settlement does not grant
right of release to parents in detention with their children.22 Lastly, it
held that the government could not alter the Settlement to reflect that it
11 See also Claudia Morales, Families Crossing the Border: ‘We Are Not Criminals,’ CNN
(Nov. 2, 2016, 1:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/02/us/family-immigration-detention-centers/
index.html.
12 Hereinafter, Flores refers to Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2016).
13 The minors in the original lawsuit were detained by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS”). Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act in 2002, which abolished INS and
shifted most of its immigration functions to DHS, which houses Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (“ICE”). The Homeland Security Act delegated responsibility for the care and custody of unac-
companied minors to the Office of Refugee Resettlement in the Department of Health and Human
Services. Id. at 904.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 902-05.
16 Id. at 902 (The term “Settlement” in this Note refers to the Flores consent decree. The
Flores Settlement is a 1987 stipulated consent decree between the U.S. government and a minor
plaintiff class. The Settlement was eventually approved by the court in 1997 and is still in effect
today).
17 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2016).
18 Id. at 898.
19 Id.
20 Hereinafter, “Ninth Circuit.”
21 Flores, 828 F.3d at 904.
22 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2016).
3
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did not apply to accompanied minors.23 The most significant portion of
the ruling is the overturning of the district court’s holding regarding par-
ents’ right of release with their children, which is the focus of this Note’s
argument.24
Section I provides the procedural and factual background of Flores
v. Lynch, the recent history of family detention centers, and discusses the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling of the case. Section II provides the argument that,
although the Ninth Circuit’s holding is correct, the government refusing
to release parents with their children is unconstitutional because it vio-
lates the parents’ fundamental right to custody over their biological child
and family unity. Furthermore, this Note urges Congress to codify law to
ensure the constitutional rights afforded to detained families are recog-
nized and parents are released with their children.
I. BACKGROUND
This section describes how the Settlement was formed and how it
arrived before the Ninth Circuit. The section begins with a detailed
description of the facts that resulted in the formation of the Settlement. It
continues with a background on the history of family detention centers in
the United States as it relates to this case. Next, is a discussion of the
underlying litigation that resulted in the Ninth Circuit hearing the case.
Lastly, this section provides a brief discussion of what the Ninth Circuit
held in Flores.
A. HOW THE SETTLEMENT WAS FORMED
In 1984, the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (“INS”)
Western Region adopted a new release policy for deportable minors in
government custody.25 The INS policy allowed for detained minors to
only be released to parents or lawful guardians.26 Additionally, the policy
allowed that in “unusual and extraordinary cases,” certain agents could
release a minor to a responsible individual who agreed to provide care
and be accountable for the wellbeing and welfare of the child.27 In 1985,
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991, 994 (9th Cir. June 20, 1990), opinion
vacated and superseded on rehearing Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th
Cir. Aug. 9, 1991), rev’d, Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 295-96 (1993). The original complaint
raised seven claims. Two of the claims challenged the INS Western Region’s release policy on
constitutional, statutory, and international law grounds, and the final five claims challenged the con-
ditions of the minors’ detention. Id.
26 Flores by Galvez-Maldonado, 934 F.2d at 994.
27 Id.
4
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four plaintiffs, including named plaintiff Jenny Flores, filed a class action
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California
against the U.S. government, alleging that the INS release policy was
unconstitutional and challenging the conditions of juvenile detention.28
The district court certified two separate classes composed of all persons
under the age of 18 within the INS Western Region that had been, were,
or would be detained by INS agents, and those who had been, were, or
would be subjected to the conditions the plaintiff class was arguing
against.29
The parties entered into a consent decree, the Settlement, on Novem-
ber 30, 1987.30 The Settlement required that minors held in the custody
of INS in the Western Region for more than 72 hours be housed in facili-
ties meeting certain standards, including state standards for the housing
and care of dependent children.31 For example, the terms include stan-
dards requiring the government to provide adequate reading materials to
detained juveniles and opportunities for exercise.32
The district court granted the plaintiff class partial summary judg-
ment on their Equal Protection Clause (“EPC”) claim that the INS had
violated the EPC by treating minors in deportation and exclusion pro-
ceedings differently.33 In response to the court’s holding, the INS
adopted a new rule allowing minors in deportation proceedings “to be
28 Id. This case ultimately stemmed from the unreasonable body searches of minors in INS
custody and procedures or lack thereof, the government had in place. Id.
29 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 2016). The two classes were composed of:
“1. All persons under the age of eighteen (18) years who have been, are, or will be arrested
and detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 by the [INS] within the INS’ Western Region and
who have been, are, or will be denied release from INS custody because a parent or legal
guardian fails to personally appear to take custody of them.
2. All persons under the age of eighteen (18) years who have been, are, or will be arrested
and detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(“INS”) within the INS’ Western Region and who have been, are, or will be subjected to any
of the following conditions:
a. inadequate opportunities for exercise or recreation;
b. inadequate educational instruction;
c. inadequate reading materials;
d. inadequate opportunities for visitation with counsel, family, and friends;
e. regular contact as a result of confinement with adult detainees unrelated to such
minors either by blood, marriage, or otherwise;
f. strip or body cavity search after meeting with counsel or at any other time or occa-
sion absent demonstrable adequate cause.” Id.
30 Id.
31 Stipulated Settlement Agreement at Flores v. Meese, (C.D. Cal. 1997), https://www.aclu
.org/legal-document/flores-v-meese-stipulated-settlement-agreement-plus-extension-settlement.
32 Flores, 828 F.3d at 902.
33 Id. The differences in these two proceedings is not relevant to this Note or the current
litigation. “Prior to April 1997 deportation and exclusion were separate removal procedures. The
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 consolidated these proce-
5
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released to their parents, adult relatives, or custodians designated by their
parents; and if no adult relative was available, the rule allowed the INS
discretion to release a detained relative” with the minor.34
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court35 in Reno v. Flores, heard the con-
stitutional arguments raised by the plaintiff class.36 In the original litiga-
tion, minors who were detained without their parents, (“unaccompanied
minors”), sought to be released to people other than their parents and
argued it was unconstitutional to hold them in detention.37 The Supreme
Court held that the new policy was constitutional because the INS could
not send the unaccompanied minors “off into the night on bond” or on
their own recognizance.38
The Supreme Court reasoned that the INS had “decided to strike a
balance” by creating a list of assumingly suitable guardians while pre-
serving “the discretion of local INS directors to release detained minors
to other custodians in unusual and compelling circumstances.”39 At the
top of the list are parents, “whom our society and this Court’s jurispru-
dence have always presumed to be the preferred and primary custodians
of their minor children.”40
Additionally, the Supreme Court held that the right to be released to
someone other than a parent is not a fundamental right, and that the gov-
ernment must know that someone will care for the minor pending deter-
mination of his or her deportation proceedings.41 The Court reasoned it
“is easily done when the juvenile’s parents have also been detained and
the family can be released together; it becomes complicated when the
juvenile is arrested alone, i.e., unaccompanied by a parent, guardian, or
other related adult.”42 The Supreme Court held that the government must
only provide care that is adequate, and is not required to release juveniles
to adults that are not family members.43
In 1997, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
approved the Settlement, which ultimately “sets out nationwide policy
for the detention, release, and treatment of minors in the custody of INS”
dures.” Deportation, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/
deportation (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
34 Flores, 828 F.3d at 902; see Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1993); Detention and
Release of Juveniles, 53 Fed. Reg. 17449, 17451 (1988) (codified as amended, 8 C.F.R. § 236.3).
35 Hereinafter, “Supreme Court.”
36 Flores, 507 U.S. at 294-95.
37 Id. at 301-02.
38 Id. at 295.
39 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 310 (1993).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 295.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 313-15; Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2016).
6
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and is still in effect today.44 The Settlement was to terminate within five
years of court approval or within three years after the court found the
government to be in substantial compliance with the Settlement.45 In
2001, the parties stipulated that the Settlement would terminate 45 days
after the government’s final publication of regulations applying the Set-
tlement.46 As of the publication of this Note, the government has not yet
published these regulations. However, Congress partially codified the
terms of the Settlement, creating some statutory standards for unaccom-
panied minors through the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Pro-
tection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”).47
The Settlement guides the government standards for minors in cus-
tody regarding “food, clothing, grooming items, medical and dental care,
individualized needs assessments, educational services, recreation and
leisure time, counseling, access to religious services, contact with family
members, and a reasonable right to privacy.”48 It defines the contracting
class as “[a]ll minors who are detained in the legal custody of the INS.”49
The Settlement states that, when a juvenile is taken into custody by the
INS, the INS shall expeditiously process the juvenile, provide the juve-
nile with a notice of rights, and if release is not possible, place the juve-
nile in a non-secured, licensed facility within five days.50 However, the
Settlement also provides that in “the event of an emergency or influx of
minors into the United States, the INS need only make the transfer as
expeditiously as possible.”51
The Settlement creates a presumption in favor of releasing
juveniles.52 If INS determines that detention of the minor is not required
“either to secure his or her timely appearance before the INS or the im-
migration court, or to ensure the minor’s safety or that of others, the INS
shall release a minor from its custody without unnecessary delay . . . .”53
Furthermore, it requires prompt and continuous efforts toward family
44 Flores, 828 F.3d at 901, 904.
45 Stipulated Settlement Agreement at Flores v. Meese, (C.D. Cal. 1997), https://www.aclu
.org/legal-document/flores-v-meese-stipulated-settlement-agreement-plus-extension-settlement.
46 Flores, 828 F.3d at 903.
47 Id. at 904; see 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A) (an unaccompanied minor “shall be promptly
placed in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child,” subject to flight and
danger concerns). TVPRA is not relevant to this Note because this Note focuses solely on accompa-
nied minors.
48 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Paragraph 12 of the
Settlement).
49 Id. at 902 (quoting Paragraph 10 of the Settlement).
50 Id. (quoting Paragraph 12(A) of the Settlement).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 901.
53 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2016).
7
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reunification and the release of the juvenile.54 In certain situations, some
minors may be held in juvenile detention facilities instead of a licensed
program.55
B. U.S. IMMIGRATION FAMILY DETENTION CENTERS
Prior to 2001, families that were stopped by the government for en-
tering the United States illegally were often released as opposed to being
detained because of the lack of family bed space available.56 Detained
families were housed separately, and parents were split from their chil-
dren.57 However, immigration policy drastically changed after the events
of September 11, 2001, leading to “more restrictive immigration con-
trols, tougher enforcement, and broader expedited removal of illegal
aliens, which made the automatic release of families problematic.”58
In 2001, a family detention center was opened in Berks County,
Pennsylvania (“Berks”).59 In 2006, DHS opened a second facility, the
Don T. Hutto Family Residential Center (“Hutto”).60 In 2007, three mi-
nors at Hutto sued the government in the Western District of Texas alleg-
ing that the detention conditions violated the terms of the Settlement and
sought to be released with their parents, who were being detained with
them.61 During the litigation proceedings of Bunikyte ex rel. Bunikiene v.
Chertoff, the plaintiffs and their parents sought asylum from various
countries while being detained at Hutto.62 The government argued that
the Settlement only applied to unaccompanied minors.63 Ultimately, the
district court disagreed with the government and found that by its terms,
the Settlement applies to all minors in the custody of government agen-
cies such as ICE and DHS and that it had been violated.64 The court
rejected the claim that the Settlement entitled parents a right of release.65
The case settled before trial; however, the Ninth Circuit used the decision
54 Id. (quoting Paragraph 18 of the Settlement).
55 Id. (quoting Paragraph 12 of the Settlement).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2016).
59 Id. Berks is a converted nursing home. Id.
60 Id. at 904. In 2009, ICE stopped detaining families in the Hutto facility. Between 2009 and
2014, the Berks facility was the only family dentition facility in operation. Hutto is located in Tay-
lor, Texas, and was previously a medium security prison. Id.; Lazaro Zamora, What You Need to
Know: Immigrant Family Detention, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 27, 2015), http://bipar-
tisanpolicy.org/blog/what-you-need-to-know-immigrant-family-detention/.
61 Flores, 828 F.3d at 904.
62 Bunikyte ex rel. Bunikiene v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 1074070 at *1 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
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in its Flores analysis to reverse the district court’s holding, which
granted parents a right of release.66
In 2014, there was significant growth in the number of undocu-
mented parents and children entering the United States-Mexico border
from Central America.67 At the time, Berks detention facility was the
only open and operating family detention center.68 In response to the vast
increase of families arriving at the border, the government opened three
more family detention centers in Karnes City and Dilley, Texas, and
Artesia, New Mexico.69 Karnes and Dilly currently operate under ICE’s
Family Residential Standards;70 those standards do not conform to the
requirements of the Settlement.71
Previously, in 2011, ICE’s policy was to place families stopped near
the border in regular removal proceedings rather than expedited removal
proceedings.72 However, in the summer of 2014, when the number of
unaccompanied children and families increased, the policy changed.73
After the increase, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson publicly stated that the
government would detain families in order to deter others from coming
to the United States.74 After this statement, DHS began placing families,
consisting primarily of mothers and their children, in expedited removal
proceedings, and detaining them, rather than issuing them Notices to Ap-
pear and then releasing them.75
In January 2015, in the U.S. District Court of Colombia, a group of
Central American migrants filed a class action against the government
regarding the government’s release policy under the Due Process
Clause.76 In R.I.L–R v. Johnson, the plaintiffs’ alleged that DHS had
adopted a no-release policy as to Central American families.77 The dis-
trict court held that the government had not implemented such a policy,
66 Id. (quoting In re Hutto Family Det. Ctr., No. 1:07–cv–00164–SS, Dkt. 94 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 26, 2007)).
67 Flores, 828 F.3d at 904; see Jonathan T. Hiskey et al., Understanding the Central Ameri-
can Refugee Crisis, AMERICAN IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.americanimmigration
council.org/research/understanding-central-american-refugee-crisis.
68 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf.
69 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2016).
70 Family Residential Standards, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice
.gov/detention-standards/family-residential (last visited Sept. 4, 2017).
71 Flores, 828 F.3d at 904.





76 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2016).
77 Id.
9
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but did find support for the plaintiffs’ alternative assertion that the policy
directed ICE agents to factor “deterrence of mass migration” into their
custody decisions.78 Furthermore, the district court found the DHS policy
of deterrence to be a factor that had played a substantial part in the high
number of Central American families being detained.79
In May 2015, the government informed the district court that it
would no longer use deterrence as a factor in family custody determina-
tions.80 Following the government’s statement to the court and through
an agreement between the parties, the case ended.81 The Ninth Circuit
also considered this case in its analysis of Flores v. Lynch.82
C. FLORES V. LYNCH IN THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
On February 2, 2015, the most recent litigation was brought in the
Central District of California.83 The Flores class filed a motion seeking
to enforce the terms of the Settlement and arguing, similarly to R.I.L–R.
v. Johnson, that the government had breached the Settlement in a number
of ways.84 The plaintiff class alleged that the government was not releas-
ing minors as it had in the past and failed to abide by the standards of
care required under the terms of the Settlement.85
The plaintiff class brought the motion to enforce the 18-year-old
Settlement against then acting U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh
Johnson, DHS, and its subordinate entities, ICE and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP”).86 In response, the government argued that
the terms of the Settlement do not extend to accompanied minors and
filed a motion to amend the Settlement to reflect that claim.87 The plain-
tiff class proposed that the government comply with the Settlement by
releasing minors without unwarranted delay and firstly to a parent, in-
cluding any parents who were apprehended and currently detained along-
side that minor.88 The district court acknowledged that the terms of the




81 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2016).
82 Id. at 904-05.
83 Id. at 905; The Settlement provides for legal claims to be brought in the Central District of
California; however, it allows for individual challenges to placement or detention conditions to be
brought in any district court that venue is proper and where the court has jurisdictional power to hear
the case. Id. at 903.




88 Id. at 908.
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ment in detention.89 However, it reasoned “ICE’s blanket no-release pol-
icy with respect to mothers cannot be reconciled with the Agreement’s
grant to class members of a right to preferential release to a parent.”90
On July 24, 2015, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to
enforce the Settlement in family detention centers.91 The district court
held that the government had breached the Settlement because the terms
apply to all minors in detention,92 and denied the government’s motion
to amend the Settlement.93 The district court held that the government
must comply with the Settlement, and unless the parent is subject to
mandatory detention, “the government must release an accompanying
parent as long as doing so would not create or pose a significant flight
risk or safety risk.”94
The district court reinforced its conclusion by finding that the regu-
lation upheld by the Supreme Court in the original Flores v. Reno case
did support the release of an accompanying family member.95 The lan-
guage of the Settlement that the district court focused on was: “[i]f a
relative who is not in detention cannot be located to sponsor the minor,
the minor may be released with an accompanying relative who is in de-
tention.”96 Furthermore, it found support through ICE’s prior practice of
usually releasing parents who were not found to be a flight risk or safety
risk.97
On October 23, 2015, the district court set forth the remedies the
government was required to implement for its breach.98 Although the
district court entertained the motion to amend, it found the government
had not moved to modify the Settlement properly and held that the Set-
tlement could not be altered.99 The district court discussed in detail why
89 Id.
90 Id. (quoting Flores v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 3d 864, 874 (C.D. Cal. 2015)).
91 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2016).
92 Flores, 212 F. Supp. 3d at 872.
93 Flores, 828 F.3d at 905.
94 Id. at 908.
95 Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(3)(ii) (2011).
96 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(3) (1997));
cf. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 315 (1993).
97 Flores, 828 F.3d at 908.
98 Id. at 901 (The district court ordered the government to implement the following remedies:
“(1) ‘make prompt and continuous efforts toward family reunification,’ (2) release class members
without unnecessary delay, (3) detain class members in appropriate facilities, (4) release an accom-
panying parent when releasing a child unless the parent is subject to mandatory detention or poses a
safety risk or a significant flight risk, (5) monitor compliance with detention conditions, and (6)
provide class counsel with monthly statistical information.”).
99 Flores v. Lynch, 212 F. Supp. 3d 907, 910 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and
remanded by Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2016).
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it rejected the government’s motion for reconsideration.100 The govern-
ment appealed to the Ninth Circuit.101 On appeal, the government argued
that the Settlement only applies to unaccompanied minors and is not vio-
lated when minors accompanied by parents or other adult family mem-
bers are placed in family detention centers.102 Furthermore, the
government challenged the district court’s holding regarding the right of
release of parents and the district court’s denial of its motion to modify
the Settlement.103
D. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS OF FLORES V. LYNCH
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Settlement unambiguously
applies to accompanied104 and unaccompanied minors; the Settlement
does not provide parents who accompany detained minors an affirmative
right of release; and modification of the Settlement was not necessary.105
Previously, no court has held that the Settlement applied to accompanied
minors in detention. This section discusses the three holdings
individually.
1. Settlement Applies to All Minors
First, the Ninth Circuit held that the Settlement unambiguously ap-
plies to accompanied and unaccompanied minors by its express terms.106
The Settlement defines a minor as “any person under the age of eighteen
(18) years who is detained in the legal custody of the INS.”107 Further-
more, the Settlement’s scope is described as setting a “nationwide policy
for the detention, release, and treatment of minors in the custody of the
INS,” and it defines the plaintiff class as “[a]ll minors who are detained
100 Id. at 909-14. The court rejected the motion based on Local Rule 7–18. The court found
that none of the enumerated limitations applied, and that the defendants improperly brought the
motion for reconsideration. Id.
101 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2016).
102 Id. at 905-10.
103 Id.
104 Immigration laws do not define the term ‘accompanied’ children or minors, but children
arriving in the United States with a parent or guardian are considered accompanied. See AM. IM-
MIGR. COUNCIL, A Guide to Children Arriving at the Border: Laws, Policies and Responses (June 26,
2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/guide-children-arriving-border-laws-
policies-and-responses.
105 Flores, 828 F.3d at 901.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 905.
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in the legal custody of the INS.”108 This language led the Ninth Circuit to
hold that the Settlement expressly and clearly applies to all minors.109
Additionally, the court reasoned, as did the district court before it,
that the Settlement affords special guidelines for unaccompanied minors
in certain situations, and “it would make little sense to write rules mak-
ing special reference to unaccompanied minors if the parties intended the
Agreement as a whole to be applicable only to unaccompanied mi-
nors.”110 The court reasoned that the Settlement also explicitly identifies
certain minors that the class definition does not apply to, such as emanci-
pated minors.111 This language led the court to conclude that if the par-
ties wanted to exclude accompanied minors from the Settlement, they
could have clearly done so when they listed the other exclusions.112
2. Affirmative Release Rights of Parents
Second, the Ninth Circuit held that the Settlement does not grant a
right of release to parents and the district court erred in its interpreta-
tion.113 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that unless the information is ambig-
uous, the Settlement must be interpreted only through the information
found within its four corners because it is a consent decree.114 It held that
the terms of the Settlement do not explicitly provide any rights to adults,
so it does not grant a right of release.115 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that,
even though the Settlement grants minors the right to preferential release
to a parent, the government does not have to make a parent available by
also releasing them.116 The Ninth Circuit held that it only means that if a
parent is already available, then that person is the first choice.117
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the language of the Set-
tlement is straightforward, and not ambiguous; therefore, it need not con-
108 Id.; see Paragraphs 4, 9, and 10 of the Settlement.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 905-06; see Paragraphs 12(A) and 25 of the Settlement.
111 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir. 2016).
112 Id. at 905-06; see Paragraph 4 of the Settlement. This Note does not address the govern-
ment’s arguments because the court properly found the express language makes the Settlement ap-
plicable to all minors.
113 Id. at 908.
114 Id.
115 Id.; Consent decrees which, “like a contract, must be discerned within its four corners,
extrinsic evidence being relevant only to resolve ambiguity in the decree.” United States v. Asarco
Inc., 430 F.3d 972, 980 (9th Cir. 2005).
116 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 908 (9th Cir. 2016).
117 Id. The court further supported its holding with the Western District of Texas court’s
reasoning in Bunikyte; see Bunikyte ex rel. Bunikiene v. Chertoff, Nos. A-07-CA-164-SS, A-07-
CA-165-SS, A-07-CA-166-SS, 2007 WL 1074070 at *16-17 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (case settled before
the court issued a ruling); see also 8 C.F.R. § 236.3.
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sider any extrinsic evidence to determine the true intent of the parties.118
However, it stated that the extrinsic evidence did not indicate that the
parties intended to grant parents a right of release.119 The court held, “the
context of the Flores Settlement argues against this result: the Settlement
was the product of litigation in which unaccompanied minors argued that
release to adults other than their parents was preferable to remaining in
custody until their parents could come get them.”120
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the instruction the district court
relied upon in its decision at most demonstrated that the parties might
have considered releasing an adult family member when creating the Set-
tlement, but did not actually agree to do so in the text.121 Furthermore,
the Ninth Circuit held that there is no evidence to support that the gov-
ernment ever once released more parents and children because of the
Settlement as opposed to other reasons.122 On appeal, the plaintiff class
proposed that the Ninth Circuit “construe the district court’s order nar-
rowly,” asserting that the government should “grant accompanying par-
ents individualized custody determinations,” just as it would single
adults, in accordance with the appropriate laws and regulations.123
However, the Ninth Circuit stated that the district court went too far
with its ruling by incorrectly placing the burden of releasing a parent on
the government.124 The burden is usually placed on the noncriminal de-
tainee to establish “he or she does not present a danger to persons or
property, is not a threat to the national security, and does not pose a risk
of flight.”125 This burden was shifted by the district court requiring the
government to release an accompanying parent unless the parent is sub-
ject to mandatory detention or after it conducted an individualized cus-
tody determination.126 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found that the
district court’s order required the government to justify detention by a
higher standard, which was a showing that a parent is a “significant flight
risk,” while the normal standard is only “a risk of flight.”127
Lastly, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the parents were never
plaintiffs in the Flores case nor members of the two certified classes.128
Thus, it held that the Settlement does not afford parents any affirmative
118 Flores, 828 F.3d at 908.
119 Id. at 908-09.
120 Id. at 909.
121 Id. (relying on 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(3)(ii)).
122 Id.
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release rights, and the lower court erred by granting parents such
rights.129 The Ninth Circuit did not express its opinion as to whether
parents have a right of release; instead, it held that the terms do not ex-
pressly grant that right.130
3. Modification of the Settlement
Third, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the government’s motion to amend the Settle-
ment.131 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the moving party “bears the
burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances war-
rants revision of the decree” in order for it to be modified.132 If the mov-
ing party can meet the required standard, then “the court should consider
whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed
circumstance.”133 In reviewing the record, the Ninth Circuit found that
the Settlement should not be altered because there was no indication that
the parties did not anticipate an influx of minors crossing the border
when the parties entered into the Settlement.134 Furthermore, it reasoned
that modification should not be permitted in cases where a party relies
upon occurrences that were anticipated at the time it entered into a con-
sent decree.135
The Ninth Circuit found that the Settlement clearly expected an in-
flux to occur, and if one did occur, the government agencies were al-
lowed more time to release minors or could place them in certain
licensed facilities.136 Furthermore, even if the plaintiff class and the gov-
ernment had not predicted such an increase in the number of minors, the
Ninth Circuit did not understand how a “suitably tailored response to the
change in circumstances” would be to prevent an entire group of mi-
grants from the terms of the Settlement.137
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that no substantial modifi-
cation to the law had occurred to justify alteration of the Settlement to
not extend to accompanied minors.138 The court reasoned that if a change
in law is the basis for modification, then “the moving party must estab-
lish that the provision it seeks to modify has become ‘impermissi-
129 Id.
130 Id. at 909 n.4.
131 Id. at 910.
132 Id. at 909.
133 Id.






Lakosil: The Flores Settlement
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2018
46 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
ble.’”139 The court stated that the restructuring of government agencies
overseeing minors in custody did not require a modification to the Settle-
ment.140 Furthermore, even if “some provisions of the TVPRA regarding
the detention and release of unaccompanied minors” might be inconsis-
tent with the Settlement, at most, that would provide for alteration of just
those provisions.141 Additionally, the creation of rights under TVPRA for
unaccompanied children did not make the Settlement “impermissible” if
applied to accompanied children.142
II. ARGUMENT: CUSTODY AND FAMILY UNITY
Although this Note agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning for its
holding in Flores,143 it argues that the plaintiff class should not appeal
the court’s decision. Instead, it provides the parents with a constitutional
violation claim to achieve the goal of simultaneous release. This Note
argues that while the terms of the Settlement do not require the govern-
ment to release a parent with their child, it is unconstitutional for the
government to not release parents with their children because it violates
the parents’ fundamental right to custody over one’s biological child and
family unity. Separating families in detention is a constitutional violation
of the parents’ Substantive Due Process rights because the government is
depriving the parents of a fundamental right granted to them under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.144
Subsection A explains Substantive Due Process and the strict scru-
tiny test. Subsection B explains the fundamental right of custody and
family unity and explains why custody is a constitutional right afforded
to all individuals, even those who are in the United States “illegally.”
Subpart 1 argues why the “best interest of the child” standard should be
applied in family immigration cases and why it is in the child’s best
interest to be released with a parent. Subpart 2 provides examples of
constitutional restrictions that have been upheld and differentiates those
cases. Subpart 3 combines the examples and arguments from Subparts 1
and 2, and establishes that the action of separating families is an infringe-
ment on established fundamental rights. Subsection C argues the govern-
ment is infringing on the parents’ fundamental rights to custody and
family unity. Subsection D explains why strict scrutiny applies and ar-
139 Id. at 909-10.
140 Id. at 910.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning for its holding is outside the scope of this Note.
144 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210
(1982).
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gues against the hypothetical government interest of “national security.”
Finally, Subsection E argues that less restrictive means exist such as re-
leased monitoring systems; therefore, the government action of separat-
ing families is unconstitutional because it fails the strict scrutiny test.
This Note also acknowledges that, if the government continues to
keep children in detention longer than necessary based on the release
eligibility of their parents or to not break the family unit apart, then the
government will be breaching the terms of the Settlement, and the plain-
tiff class can bring a claim against the government for the breach. Fur-
thermore, this Note urges Congress to codify law, like it did for
unaccompanied minors with TVPRA, to ensure the constitutional rights
afforded to this vulnerable population is recognized and followed.
A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND STRICT SCRUTINY
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution prohibits the government from depriving individuals
of their “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”145 Every
Due Process analysis starts with the question: has the government de-
prived an individual of one of these rights?146 The Substantive Due Pro-
cess doctrine requires all governmental intrusions into fundamental rights
and liberties be fair and reasonable and in furtherance of a legitimate
governmental interest.147 In order to be found constitutional, the infringe-
ment must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest.148
The Substantive Due Process doctrine is applied under the Four-
teenth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.149 Since family
law is usually reserved to the States, this Note uses many cases that in-
volve states infringing on fundamental rights, which the courts analyze
under the Fourteenth Amendment.150 Here, a Fifth Amendment analysis
145 U.S. Const. amend. V.
146 National Paralegal College, Substantive Due Process – Fundamental Rights, LAWShelf
Educ. Med., https://nationalparalegal.edu/conLawCrimProc_Public/DueProcess/SubstantiveFunda-
mentalRights.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
147 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993); see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 938 (4th ed. 2013).
148 Flores, 507 U.S. at 301-02.
149 Legal Info. Inst., Substantive Due Process, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell
.edu/wex/substantive_due_process (last visited Aug. 1, 2017). The Fifth Amendment protects people
from the federal government intruding on their liberty interests, and through the doctrine of incorpo-
ration, the Fourteenth Amendment protects people from the states intruding on those same interests.
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77-78 (1976); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 938
(4th ed. 2013).
150 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398-403 (1923); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 938 (4th ed. 2013).
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applies because it is the federal government intruding on a fundamental
right.151
The Supreme Court has held that Due Process and liberty protec-
tions are not afforded only to U.S. citizens.152 The fourth President of the
United States, James Madison, wrote “as they [aliens], owe, on the one
hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to their [consti-
tutional] protection and advantage.”153 More recently, the Supreme Court
in Zadvydas v. Davis, made it clear that “once an alien enters the coun-
try, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies
to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”154 Addi-
tionally, the Due Process Clause protects an individual subject to a final
order of deportation.155
In countless cases, the Supreme Court has held that the laws and
traditions of the United States grant constitutional protection to individ-
ual decisions relating to family relationships, child rearing, marriage,
procreation, and education.156 The right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives people the full right to engage in personal conduct without
intervention of the government.157
Ordinarily when the federal government infringes on a fundamental
liberty interest, a strict scrutiny standard applies.158 The Supreme Court
has explained that the Substantive Due Process rights provided by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments afford “heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty in-
terests.”159 When strict scrutiny applies, it is the government’s responsi-
bility to demonstrate the compelling nature of its interest and the
151 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
152 Id.
153 Raoul Lowery Contreras, Yes, Illegal Aliens Have Constitutional Rights, THE HILL (Sept.
29, 2015, 12:30 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/255281-yes-illegal-aliens-
have-constitutional-rights.
154 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210
(1982).
155 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693-94.
156 E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,
255 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923).
157 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
158 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 938 (4th ed. 2013).
159 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997); see also Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000).
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necessity of the chosen means.160 As custody and family unity are estab-
lished fundamental rights, the court should apply a strict scrutiny test.161
B. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AT STAKE – CUSTODY AND FAMILY UNITY
The interests of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children are arguably some of the oldest fundamental liberty interests
recognized by the Supreme Court.162 The Supreme Court has stated on
numerous occasions that the relationship between a parent and child is
constitutionally protected.163 “It is cardinal with us [Supreme Court] that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder.”164 It is established that one of
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause is the freedom of per-
sonal choice in matters of family life.165
Family law proceedings and the decision to terminate parental rights
are regulated by the individual states.166 The Supreme Court has ex-
plained the law’s view of the family “rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judg-
ment required for making life’s difficult decisions.”167 The Supreme
Court has recognized that the natural bonds of affection will often cause
parents to act in the best interests of their children.168 The Supreme Court
stated that it holds “little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be
offended” if the government attempted to break up a natural family unit
over the objections of the family “without some showing of unfitness and
for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best
interest.”169
160 U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-51 (1987).
161 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 59, 65-66.
162 Id.
163 E.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
164 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255.
165 Id.
166 Child Welfare Information Gateway, Grounds for Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. 16 (Dec. 2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/
pubPDFs/groundtermin.pdf.
167 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
168 Id.
169 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651-52, 657 (1972).
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1. Parental Unfitness and the “Best Interest of the Child” Standard
In determining whether the separation of family members in deten-
tion centers is constitutional, the standard the Court should apply is the
“best interest of the child” standard.170
The best interest of the child standard “requires prioritizing family
integrity and the maintenance of emotional ties and relationships among
family members.”171 Although the Supreme Court in the original Reno v.
Flores litigation pointed out that the “best interest of the child” is not a
constitutionally recognized standard, all 50 states, the District of Colum-
bia, and all the U.S. territories, have statutes that require a “child’s best
interests” be considered whenever certain decisions are made concerning
a child’s custody, placement, or other critical life issue.172 While apply-
ing the standard, the Supreme Court held that, even when a biological
parent has not been found “unfit,” the parent’s Due Process rights are not
deprived when the court terminates a parent-child relationship, if termi-
nation is in the “best interests of the child” and it does not break apart a
recognized family unit.173
The “best interest of the child” standard and parental “fitness” often
overlap because, as the Supreme Court explained, a presumption exists
that “fit” parents act in the best interests of their child.174 As long as a
parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will
normally be no reason for a state to inject itself into the private realm of
the family.175 The Due Process Clause does not authorize “a State to
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing deci-
sions” simply because a state official believes a better decision could be
made.176
Before a state may involuntarily sever the rights of parents and bio-
logical children, parental unfitness must be proven because a parent and
child share an interest in preventing a wrongful termination of their rela-
tionship.177 The Due Process Clause requires that the state support its
allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence as to whether a
170 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf.
171 Id.
172 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-04 (1993); U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs.,
Determining the Best Interest of the Child, CHILD. BUREAU, https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/
best_interest.pdf#page=2&view=Best%20interests%20definition (last updated March 2016).
173 See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255.
174 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
175 Id. (finding a state statute unconstitutional because it allowed the court to dictate who
could have visitation rights even though the parents were “fit”).
176 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73.
177 Id. at 73; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
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parent is “unfit” and to determine if severance of the relationship is in the
“best interest of the child.”178 However, if the child does not have an
existing relationship with the parent, the court does not necessarily need
to find the parent “unfit” to terminate the relationship.179
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the “care, cus-
tody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because
they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their
child to the State.”180 The Court reasoned, “[e]ven when blood relation-
ships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irre-
trievable destruction of their family life.”181
Involuntary termination of parental rights occurs when a child can-
not safely return home due to “risk of harm by the parent or the inability
of the parent to provide for the child’s basic needs,” which in most states
will constitute as parental unfitness.182 Furthermore, the most common
grounds states use when determining parental unfitness are: “severe or
chronic abuse or neglect, sexual abuse,” abuse of other children in the
household, abandonment, mental illness or deficiency of the parents that
is long term, drug or alcohol induced incapacity of the parents that is
long term, failure to support or maintain contact, and involuntary termi-
nation of rights between the parent and another child.183 A violent felony
conviction of the parent against the child or another family member is
another common ground for termination.184 A conviction for any felony
that results in long-term incarceration and requires the child to enter fos-
ter care could, in some cases, constitute a ground for termination of pa-
rental rights.185
Although the reasons for termination of parental rights vary from
state to state, one thing is consistent across the nation: adjudication is
necessary before custody rights are severed.186 The adjudication must
demonstrate that the parent is “unfit” and termination is in “the best in-
terest of the child.”187 Both of these requirements must be supported by
178 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 774, 759, 769.
179 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
180 Id. at 752-53.
181 Id. at 753.
182 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Grounds for Involuntary Termination of Parental





186 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760
(1982).
187 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Grounds for Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights, CHILD. BUREAU (December 2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/groundtermin
.pdf.
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clear and convincing evidence before parents lose their constitutional
right to custody of their child.188 Adjudication has not occurred when
families are in detention awaiting their deportation and/or asylum hear-
ings. Furthermore, the parents have not been found “unfit” by clear and
convincing evidence. Thus, the government should not interject itself in
the family unit and sever natural relationships by releasing family mem-
bers separately because it is not in the best interest of the children.
Federal courts should apply the standard used throughout the United
States, the “best interest of the child” standard, when deciding the liberty
interests of families in federal detention. Even the DHS Advisory Com-
mittee on Family Residential Centers (DHS Committee) reported that the
standard should be applied in all custody decisions regarding family
members apprehended by the government and families should not need-
lessly be detained because it affects their best interests.189
2. When Government Restrictions on Fundamental Rights are
Constitutional
In some instances, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have
recognized that the government can limit constitutional freedoms granted
to individuals and their families. For example, the Supreme Court held
that prisons can restrict speech between family members, including par-
ent inmates and their children without violating the inmate’s constitu-
tional rights because when a person is confined in a prison, many of the
liberties and freedoms granted to other citizens must be forfeited.190
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Constitution protects cer-
tain kinds of personal relationships “[a]nd outside the prison context,
there is some discussion in our cases of a right to maintain certain famil-
ial relationships . . . .”191 However, it concluded that the “very object of
imprisonment is confinement. Many of the liberties and privileges en-
joyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate
does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration.”192 The Su-
preme Court reasoned that freedom of association is among the least
compatible with incarceration and some infringement of that freedom
must be expected in a prison context.193
188 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
189 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf.
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Another example of restricting constitutional rights is when a parent
is deportable and his or her child is a U.S. citizen. In de Robles v. INS, a
Mexican national was ordered deported on the ground that her visa had
expired.194 Maria Lopez de Robles argued it was unconstitutional under
the Fifth Amendment to break her family unit apart by deporting her to
Mexico because her children were United States citizens.195 The Tenth
Circuit rejected that argument, holding that it was not unconstitutional
when one parent is deportable and the children are not deprived of their
right to continuation of the family unit.196 The court did not analyze the
constitutional concerns; rather, it stated that the cases the plaintiff cited
were inapposite and her argument was without merit.197
Many district courts have agreed with the Tenth Circuit, finding a
valid deportation does not violate a minor child’s constitutional rights
because ultimately the child does not choose where to be born and par-
ents know they will not be allowed to stay in the country past a certain
amount of time under their visa.198 The courts have reasoned that it is not
breaking up the family unit or denying children their constitutional right
to stay in the U.S. because the children can choose to return to the U.S.
when they turn 18-years-old.199 The First Circuit held that “deportations
of parents are routine and do not of themselves dictate family separa-
tion.”200 Furthermore, the court reasoned, if it were such a right, it would
be difficult to see “why children would not also have a constitutional
right to object to a parent being sent to prison or, during periods when
the draft laws are in effect, to the conscription of a parent for prolonged
and dangerous military service.”201
The fundamental liberty interest of the parents in detention centers is
not analogous to prisoners having their constitutional rights limited while
in prison. First, many of the families in detention centers are awaiting
their asylum and deportation proceedings, and have not had an adjudica-
tion.202 An adjudication must occur before the government can interject
194 de Robles v. Immigr. and Naturalization Serv., 485 F.2d 100, 101 (10th Cir. 1973).
195 Id. at 102.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 E.g., Payne-Barahona v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007); Newton v. Immigr. and
Naturalization Serv., 736 F.2d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1984); Perdido v. Immigr. and Naturalization Serv.,
420 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1969).
199 Perdido, 420 F.2d at 1181.
200 Payne-Barahona, 474 F.3d at 3.
201 Id.
202 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf.
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itself into family units and restrict their constitutional rights.203 Second,
immigration detention is not meant to be punitive like prison.204 Thus,
families in detention should not have their constitutional rights restricted
as though they are prisoners.
Detention has been proven to be detrimental to children.205 Current
laws, particularly the Settlement, provide that juveniles in detention
should be released as quickly as possible206 because the harmful emo-
tional, psychological, and physical effects of detention on children is
well established.207 Additionally, the DHS Committee concluded that de-
tention should always be for the briefest amount of time possible, which
aligns with the Settlement terms that juveniles should be detained for the
briefest amount of time necessary.208
The previously mentioned cases the district courts rely on have a
similar fact pattern: a parent is being validly deported. The decision in de
Robles and the other federal cases are not analogous to families who are
being detained and are awaiting their deportation or asylum hearings be-
cause, in those cases, a decision to deport the person already occurred.
The Tenth Circuit also reasoned that the children could choose to relo-
cate to be with their parent so the action was constitutional. In this case,
that would be similar to asking a child to continue to stay in confinement
instead of being released without a parent. The two situations are not
analogous because, in this situation, the children and parents are awaiting
their hearings; thus, no valid deportation decision has been made.209
The district courts’ arguments do not apply to the families in Flores.
Such examples and arguments should not be considered when deciding if
parents in family detention centers can assert their constitutional right to
custody and family unity.
203 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760
(1982).
204 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf.
205 Id.
206 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2016).
207 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf.
208 Id.
209 This Note’s argument does not encompass parents that are found to be a flight risk or a
danger to the community.
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3. Separating Families is a Liberty Violation
The relationship between a parent and child is constitutionally pro-
tected and a fundamental liberty interest.210 A parent’s immigration de-
tention should not cause his or her constitutional protections to be
stripped away. A parent, whether in the United States legally or not, is
afforded protection under the U.S. Constitution and that protection
should include the right to raise his or her child and keep the family unit
intact.211
First, in determining if the separation of family members in deten-
tion centers is constitutional, the standard the courts should apply is the
“best interest of the child” standard.212 The “best interest of the child”
standard is recognized nationally, and although the Supreme Court held
it is not the constitutional standard, all 50 states, the District of Colum-
bia, and the U.S. territories, have statutes that require a “child’s best in-
terests” be considered whenever certain decisions are made concerning a
child’s custody and it is the standard that is applied in state court pro-
ceedings.213 It is in the “best interest of the child” that a child being
detained with his or her parent, also be released with his or her parent.214
The Supreme Court already held in the original Reno v. Flores litigation
that release of a child to another family member or “responsible adult” is
not a fundamental liberty interest, but being released to a parent is a
recognized right.215
Additionally, a presumption exists that “fit” parents act in the best
interests of their child.216 Currently, these are parents and children in
detention that are waiting for a decision regarding their deportation or
asylum claims.217 It is unlikely a court would find that the parents are a
threat to their children, or “unfit” under the common state standards be-
cause the parents are currently being detained with their children. Fur-
thermore, parental unfitness must be proven by clear and convincing
210 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978).
211 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02
(1993).
212 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf.
213 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Determining the Best Interest of the Child, CHILD.
BUREAU, https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/best_interest.pdf#page=2&view=Best%20interests
%20definition (last updated March 2016).
214 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf.
215 Flores, 507 U.S. at 294.
216 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
217 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf.
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evidence.218 Since no hearing nor adjudication has occurred, and the par-
ents are detained alongside their children, the government breaking apart
the family unit by not releasing the members simultaneously is an in-
fringement on the families’ liberty interests.
Second, although in some instances the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the government can limit constitutional freedoms, those in-
stances are inapposite to the families being detained in this case. Families
in detention centers have not had any adjudication occur, thus, the fami-
lies’ constitutional protections cannot simply be revoked because they
are awaiting their pending immigration hearings. Additionally, detention
is constitutional when an individual is awaiting deportation.219 However,
it is not constitutional to infringe on the parents’ right to custody simply
because the government chooses to keep the parent detained pending an
immigration decision. In all of the above-mentioned scenarios, the courts
did not recognize the parents’ loss of their fundamental rights as uncon-
stitutional because a legally recognized decision, such as being in prison
for violating a criminal law, had taken place.220
The government has the right to detain the parents and children,
however, the constitutional violation occurs when the government breaks
up the family unit to keep the parent detained. The government cannot
break up a family simply because it has the parent and child detained
together. The Ninth Circuit’s holding requires the government to release
all juveniles, including those in family detention centers, as quickly as
possible under the terms of the Settlement.221 If the government is not
releasing children as quickly as possible, it is in breach of the
Settlement.222
Current research and data indicate that most families in family de-
tention centers are seeking and are likely to be found eligible for asy-
lum.223 Such families are being detained while awaiting that
determination, which means the family could ultimately stay in the
United States if their fear is found credible and would not be deported.224
Nothing has been decided, and no other form of adjudication has oc-
curred, other than the family being placed in detention for being in the
country illegally, which is not a federal crime.225 Since a judgment has
218 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774, 759, 769 (1982).
219 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
220 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003).
221 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2016).
222 Id.
223 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf.
224 Id.
225 R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 171 (D.D.C. 2015).
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not been entered, the government severing the parents’ fundamental lib-
erty interest in caring for and raising their child is unconstitutional if less
restrictive means are available.
Therefore, the government releasing children and detaining parents
deprives parents of their fundamental right to raise and retain custody of
their children. As custody and family unity are established fundamental
rights, the courts should apply the strict scrutiny test.226
C. INFRINGEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT
In considering whether a violation of a right has occurred, the Su-
preme Court considers “the directness and substantiality of the interfer-
ence.”227 The DHS Committee concluded that the current government
detention system manages migrants and their children as if they are pre-
trial defendants or convicted inmates.228 Such behavior “diminishes their
self-esteem; impedes their access to the asylum system; negates their sta-
tus as parent, protector, and provider; undermines family relationships;
and contributes to the erosion of their physical, psychological, and social
well-being, all of which are contrary to ICE’s express commitment to
creating a safe place.”229 The DHS Committee included in its 2016 re-
port that “recent evidence suggests that some families are separated and
adults detained and placed in expedited removal or reinstatement pro-
ceedings while children are sent to the Office of Refugee
Resettlement.”230
Additionally, a statement made in March 2017, by Homeland Secur-
ity Secretary John Kelly, further supports direct evidence of government
infringement.231 In an attempt to deter illegal immigration from Mexico,
Kelly told CNN news that DHS is considering separating children from
parents caught crossing the border.232 Mr. Kelly’s proposal would result
in the parent being detained, while any accompanying children would
either be placed in government care or sent to live with any relatives
present in the United States.233
226 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
227 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 938 (4th ed. 2013).




231 Samantha Schmidt, DHS is Considering Separating Mothers and Children Who Cross the
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Keeping parents detained while releasing children infringes on the
parents’ custody rights because parents would no longer have custody of
their children while being detained. The parents could not care for and
nurture the children while in detention. The DHS Committee’s reported
findings and the statements made by Homeland Security Secretary John
Kelly supports direct and substantial interference and infringement by
the government on the parents’ fundamental right to custody of their
child. The government not only infringes on the fundamental right of
custody when it releases children without their parents, but it would also
infringe on that right if it were to separate the families immediately after
taking them into custody. The government not releasing families together
directly interferes with the fundamental right of custody and family
unity.
D. GOVERNMENT INFRINGEMENT INTENDED TO ACHIEVE A
COMPELLING INTEREST
Since the government is infringing on the parents’ fundamental right
to custody and family unity, the strict scrutiny test should be applied.
Heightened scrutiny applies to government actions when a fundamental
right is at stake.234 Under the strict scrutiny test, if a right is deemed
fundamental, the government must justify the infringement by presenting
a compelling governmental interest.235 The Supreme Court has not estab-
lished or articulated criteria for determining whether a claimed purpose is
deemed “compelling.”236 However, the Supreme Court has established
that the burden is on the government to persuade the court that a vital
interest is served by the action at issue.237 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized compelling government interests such as winning a war, assuring
children receive adequate care, and preventing flight.238
The Supreme Court has identified a potential pair of interests that,
under certain circumstances, can justify the detention of noncitizens
awaiting immigration proceedings.239 These include “preventing flight
and protecting the community from aliens found to be specially danger-
ous.”240  However, in Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held “that because
234 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17
(1982).




238 Id.; see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
239 R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 169, 188 (2000).
240 Id.
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those potentially legitimate justifications were weak or nonexistent when
applied to indefinite detention, such detention raised serious constitu-
tional concerns.”241 Additionally, the District Court for the District of
Columbia recently held that the “[i]ncantation of the magic words ‘na-
tional security’ without further substantiation is simply not enough to
justify significant deprivations of liberty.”242
In this case, the government could argue or attempt to persuade the
court that its compelling government interest in not releasing parents
with their children is a matter of “national security.”243 Although na-
tional security can be a legitimate governmental interest, the government
would be required to justify its actions and not rely solely on the words
“national security.”244 The family unit should be released simultaneously
unless the government establishes that the parent poses a higher risk to
national security than the child. Additionally, the government breaking
up a family does not clearly align with protecting the nation’s borders.
It is unlikely the government could demonstrate why keeping par-
ents in detention longer than a child is necessary for “national security,”
but even if it were found to be a legitimate compelling interest, a less
restrictive means is available that could still provide national security.
E. LESS RESTRICTIVE MEANS AVAILABLE
The final step in a Substantial Due Process analysis is to determine
if the action is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling government
interest and to determine if any less restrictive alternatives exist.245 For
the government’s action to be constitutional and survive strict scrutiny, it
must prove a less restrictive alternative does not exist to achieve its com-
pelling interest.246
241 Id.
242 Id. at 190.
243 It is not clear what the government would argue as its compelling interest. This Note
hypothetically argues the government’s interest would be “national security,” which has been of-
fered in many immigration actions. See R.I.L-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 189; Washington v. Trump, 847 F.
3d 1151, 1161-1164 (9th Cir. 2017). However, the government could raise other compelling interests
that this Note does not address, such as the concern of ensuring appearances at legal proceedings.
Regardless of the compelling interest given, less restrictive means exist; thus, it is unlikely the
government separating parents and children would be found constitutional for any given reason.
244 R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 169, 190 (2000). This Note does not argue for the right
of release for parents who are considered a flight risk because that is a recognized reason for the
government to continue detention. Additionally, if a parent is determined to be dangerous, the parent
should not have custody of their child in or out of the family detention center.
245 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 938 (4th ed. 2013); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 301-02 (1993).
246 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf.
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DHS has used various less restrictive alternatives in the past. DHS
may release individuals from detention on their own recognizance, pa-
role, bond, or with conditions of supervision.247 Currently, a probation-
ary condition that is commonly imposed requires the noncitizen to enroll
in the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (“ISAP”).248 ICE is
also piloting a case management-based alternatives-to-detention program
for families.249 Any of these alternatives to detention, i.e. released on
their own recognizance and or parole,250 would allow parents to remain
with their children and make custody decisions.
Instead of breaking up the family unit, the government can release
the parents when the children are released and utilize alternatives in or-
der to protect the nation. These alternatives to breaking families apart
should and need to be used to prevent the government’s intrusion on the
parents’ fundamental rights. The government not releasing parents and
children together does not pass the strict scrutiny test; therefore, the gov-
ernment action is unconstitutional.
III. CONCLUSION
Since a deportation decision has not yet occurred, clear and convinc-
ing evidence as to the parent’s “fitness” has not been presented, and it is
in the best interest of the child to remain with his or her parents, the
government not releasing parents and children together deprives parents
of their fundamental right to raise and have custody of their children.
Additionally, the government infringement of separating parents and
children is unlikely intended to achieve the compelling interest of “na-
tional security,” and less restrictive means exists, such as being released
on their own recognizance. Furthermore, the government action is not
narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose, therefore the government in-
fringement does not pass strict scrutiny. Thus, the government action of
breaking the family unit apart is unconstitutional.
247 Id.
248 Id. ISAP is a DHS program which requires migrants to wear ankle monitors, have em-
ployment verification, curfew checks, and usually requires telephone or in-person check-ins. Jason
Fernandes, Alternatives to Detention and the For-Profit Immigration System, CTR. FOR AM. PRO-
GRESS (June 9, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2017/06/09/4339
75/alternatives-detention-profit-immigration-system/. The author of this Note does not advocate for
the use of ISAP.
249 REP. OF THE DHS ADVISORY COMM. ON FAM. RESIDENTIAL CTRS. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf.
250 Lazaro Zamora, What You Need to Know: Immigrant Family Detention, BIPARTISAN
POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 27, 2015), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/what-you-need-to-know-immigrant-
family-detention/.
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While the holding of Flores establishes the Settlement does not re-
quire the government to release a parent with his or her child, it is uncon-
stitutional for the government to not release parents with their children
because it violates the parents’ fundamental right to custody over one’s
biological child and family unity. The holding of Flores is significant
because it stems from ongoing litigation dating back to the 1980s and its
holding continues to affect many people coming to the United States.
The cost and number of individuals detained every year is substantial,
and when other less costly and more humane alternatives exist, those
alternatives should be utilized. Parents can raise the constitutional viola-
tion claim if the government continues to release children and keep par-
ents detained. If the government continues to keep children in detention
longer than necessary based on the release eligibility of their parents, in
order to not break the family unit apart, then the government will be
breaching the terms of the Settlement, and the plaintiff class can bring a
claim against the government for the breach.
The government has continued to fail to meet the terms in the origi-
nal Settlement; therefore, it is time for Congress to make clear laws for
government agencies to follow regarding families in detention. This Note
urges Congress to codify law, like it did for unaccompanied minors with
TVPRA, to ensure the constitutional rights afforded to this vulnerable
population is recognized and followed. Congress should look to various
non-government organizations and its own subcommittee recommenda-
tions, to construct and pass legislation regarding children and parents in
government immigration proceedings and release parents and children
simultaneously to avoid violating individuals’ rights protected by the
Constitution.
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